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1. ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses some agency theory aspects that apply to the modern supply network. 
The discussion extends to cover how agency theory influences and affects business 
relationships in modern industrial supply networks. The underlying correlation between 
agency theory and the overall supply network performance is investigated by reviewing the 
existing literature. The paper also overviews a current research in progress, the research is 
concerned with performance and how it can be improved through reducing risk and 
improving collaboration in a multi-agent supply network. Flexibility and agency cost are 
proposed metrics for measuring performance from an organizational, agency perspective. The 
research main objective is attempting to improve overall multi-agent, supply network 
performance. The research focuses on how agency problem can detract from the value that a 
supply network can generate. In conclusion, through the application of agency theory, 
adjusting things like risk and collaboration in supply network will result in improved 
relationships between agents. Improved network relationships are expected to improve the 
overall performance of the network. The performance can be measured by utilizing metrics 
like flexibility and agency cost. 
Keywords: Agency theory, Organizational relationships, Collaboration, Risk. 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past four decades, competitive advantage has been obtained in many industries by 
building supply network relationships between involved agents, this	   relationship building 
activity became known as supply chain management. In the mean while, the supply chain 
concept expanded to cover the supply network. According to (Swaminathan, Smith et al. 
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1998) a supply network is a group of autonomous or semiautonomous business entities 
collectively responsible for procurement, manufacturing and distribution activities associated 
with one or more families of related products or services. Understanding business 
relationships within a supply network, as well as performance evaluation are essential prior to 
any attempts for improvement. Business relationships within a multiple agent network have 
one more dimension of complexity to them; the multiple agents can in reality be different 
parties interacting with each other. The agents tend to sometimes plan, think and as a result 
perform as individual entities within this overall supply network.  
This paper emphasizes that without giving consideration to agency theory, it is likely that 
multi-agency will negatively impact, and degrade the supply network. With the ever 
increasingly competitive markets, and globalization, the dependencies and relationships 
between network agents are becoming more and more important (Garcia-Flores, Wang et al. 
2000). On the other hand, managing the relations between network agents does not only 
mitigate potential losses, it also can lead to acquiring leverage and competitive advantage 
from multi-agency. The paper also presents the progress of a current, relevant research in 
progress. The research investigates how a better supply network performance can be achieved 
through managing agent’s relationships.  
Reducing risk and improving collaboration between agents can improve the network 
relationships. Risk can be limited through improved visibility and by redistributing power 
and control more evenly between agents in the supply according to (Christopher and Lee 
2004). Improving collaboration is mainly achieved by sharing of information between agents 
(Skjoett-Larsen, Christian et al. 2003). Since visibility is the ability of agents to see what is 
happening in other parts of the network, both sharing of information and visibility are closely 
related. This means that both collaboration and reduced risk are mutually compliant with 
each other and that neither one of them can be achieved separately.   
	  
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. 	  Agency Theory and The Agency Problem 
According to (Jensen and Meckling 1976) if agents interacting in a relationship are self 
interested and seeking their own benefit, there is a good reason to believe that a given agent 
will not always act in the best interest of other agents, this is “the agency problem”. The 
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multiplicity of agents, in the light of some human and organizational assumptions, makes 
way for the agency problem (Eisenhardt 1989). Agency theory is in place whenever one party 
(principal) delegates a task to another party (agent) and transfers the decision-making 
authority with this delegation (Eisenhardt 1989).  There may be several opportunities for 
improvement wherever two or more parties engage in a cooperative effort in a supply 
network through aligning their goals and expectations. 
Much of the existing research on agency theory addresses how it captures multi-agency 
effects on a supply network. Nevertheless, there is scarce theoretical or empirical research on 
how to measure and control the agency problem, a rather important aspect that this work sees 
as a great supply network improvement opportunity. This work adopts the term “Agency 
Problem” to describe the impact of multi-agency on a supply network; including the inherent 
goal conflict problem.  
Arguably, multi-agency can lead to the agency problem, which can detract from the value 
that the supply network can generate and negatively affect its performance (Ross 1977; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Cohen and Baruch 2010). On the other hand, (Janssen 2005) holds an 
adversarial view; having a multi-agent system increases the level of flexibility in the supply 
network and enables supply network members to become more responsive. In the light of this 
paradox, both views on multi-agency can be true. In a supply network, multi-agency can have 
severe consequences and it is almost guaranteed that the agency problem will have a negative 
effect on the network, this supports the views of (Eisenhardt 1989). Still true, if networks 
agent-relationships are managed, multi-agency can become an advantage and the network can 
possibly gain leverage from the agency situation.  
3.2. Mitigating Risk In The Supply Network 
After establishing the importance of managing supply network relationships, the paper moves 
to theoretically discussing how they can be managed and improved. A critical element in 
achieving supply chain effectiveness is establishing and nurturing trust across the supply 
network boundaries, particularly for relationships such as alliances between agents (Johnston, 
McCutcheon et al. 2004). Risk and the risk culture are some of the aspects that predominantly 
influences how agents interact in a supply network. The main conflict arises from how every 
individual agent perceives risk and how they handle it. Risk exists whenever there is a 
relatively high likelihood that a detrimental event can occur and that the event has a 
significant associated impact or cost (Zsidisin, Ellram et al. 2004). By reducing this 
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likelihood of detrimental events occurring, the uncertainty can be almost eliminated from the 
equation. (Christopher and Lee 2004) suggests that there are two ways to reduce risk in the 
supply network: visibility and control. If one or more agents cannot see what is going on in 
other parts of the supply network, they are said to have lack of visibility. Lack of visibility 
weakens trust and confidence in the supply network. The key to improved visibility in supply 
network is shared information among supply networks agents. In addition to visibility, 
fostering trust between agents in a supply network requires giving them the ability to take 
some control over supply chain operations. In looking to improve control across the wider 
supply network, a more collaborative approach to control is required. 
(Griffith, Harvey et al. 2005) challenges the theory of “more control improves trust”. Control 
can be a bad thing for two reasons; 1- the supply network can only develop and improve as 
fast as the most dominant agent when control is not distributed evenly, or when it is 
concentrated, and 2- having a dominant agent with too much control weakens trust in the 
supply network because other agents will lack control as a result. Trust has been found to be 
beneficial to organizations in general by helping avoid costs incurred due to the monitoring 
and searching for evidence of opportunism, which can occur in the absence of trusting 
relations, this is the précis of Transaction cost economics (Nooteboom and Six 2003). In the 
same way, mitigating risk and building trust between agents will result in reduced agency 
cost. This is mainly because trust will minimize the need for monitoring the performance and 
behavior of other agents in the supply network. 
3.3. Collaboration Between Agents 
 Information flow and sharing of information between agents is very important for 
collaboration in the supply network. Integration is the comprehensive collaboration among 
supply network members in strategic, tactical and operational decision-making (Bagchi, Ha et 
al. 2005). Collaboration in a supply network ensures that a community of individual agents 
acts in a collaborative and coherent manner (Davidsson, Henesey et al. 2005). Collaboration 
is a way of describing relationships that embrace both conflict and partnership, implying 
some form of mutuality without an apparent need for lifetime commitment, as compared to 
using partnership to describe the relation (Vereecke and Muylle 2006). 
Through joint planning and synchronization of business processes, agent-agent dyad go 
beyond passive information exchange and engage in proactive collaboration (Lummus, 
Vokurta et al. 1998). One of the requirements for collaboration on the strategic level is 
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having shared objectives. In theory, sharing same objectives and goals is part of the solution 
for the agency problem. By aligning the goals of agents within the network, collaboration can 
be part of the answer for the goal conflict problem that the agency theory is all about 
resolving. A collaboration that is achieved by sharing information in the supply network also 
improves visibility and trust. Improved trust and visibility reduce risk, in the same line of 
what was discussed by (Christopher and Lee 2004) in the previous part 3.2 on how this will 
improve the relationships between agents and consequently the overall performance.  
3.4. Metrics and Performance Measurement 
Supply network metrics are crucial to supply network management and they can used to 
determine whether or not the objectives of the supply network are being achieved and 
addressed (Otto and Kotzab 2003; Robertson 2006). Measuring performance can be utilized 
for monitoring expected improvements from adjusting supply network relationships and 
collaboration. In their model, (Otto and Kotzab 2003) have identified six different 
perspectives for measuring performance of the supply network. The six perspectives are 
systems dynamics, operations research-perspective, Logistics, Marketing, Organization and 
Strategy. This research also adopts that from a technical point of view, there are two 
alternative approaches to measure results of supply network management: making profits and 
reaching goals. Making profits is one of the important metrics as far as this work is concerned. 
One of the metrics proposed by the research reviewed in this paper to measure performance 
to monitor improvement is agency cost, which falls in the same category with making profits. 
Organization perspective is found the most relevant to the case in hand. Metrics from this 
perspective are utilised in this research to measure the agency problem and its effect on 
supply network. Following the organization perspective, the ideal supply network supports 
the achievement of the overall networks goals by selecting and managing appropriate 
relationships between the agents within the network and between the network and its 
environment.  
According to (Otto and Kotzab 2003) the solution, from an organisation perspective, lies in 
things like quality check of the relationships and replacing power with trust. Checking the 
quality of relationships within the supply network between agent’s means to rearrange and set 
up those relations in an SCM-manner. (Ellram and Cooper 1993) discusses that a supply 
network may try to optimize its results as a whole by specifically analysing and managing the 
trade-offs among internal functions and between its agents. (Otto and Kotzab 2003) model 
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proposes transaction costs, time to network, flexibility and density of relationships as metrics 
from the organizational perspective. This research focuses on flexibility and transaction costs. 
Transaction costs is being represented as agency cost. 
The flexibility of the institutional arrangement, or supply network in this case, may measure 
how ‘‘easily’’ a particular organizational set can be changed. Transaction costs is usually 
defined as a bundle of costs incurred by the processes of preparing routine business conduct. 
This bundle includes the costs of searching business partner or agents, monitoring the 
performance of agents, or adapting contracts. (Jensen and Meckling 1976) alternatively 
reintroduce the transaction cost as agency cost form an agency theory perspective. Agency 
cost is defined as the sum of: 1- monitoring costs incurred by the principal, 2- bonding costs 
incurred by the agent, and 3- residual loss. Bonding costs are costs incurred by agent to 
guarantee that they will not take certain actions that would harm the principal or to ensure 
that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. Residual loss is the 
financial value equivalent of the actual reduction in welfare experienced by the principal in 
the agency relationship. As previously mentioned, the research in review adopts agency cost 
and flexibility to measure the supply network performance in the light of agency theory and 
while considering supply network relationships. 
	  
4. DISCUSSION 
Ignoring the component dependencies between agents in a supply network, and not managing 
their relationships can have costly consequences for the network and its overall performance 
(Garcia-Flores, Wang et al. 2000). Existing agency theory literature seem to have a well-
established direction supporting the condemnation of the agency problem and its negative 
impact on supply network, making multi-agent systems sound undesirable and not preferable. 
According to (Ross 1977; Eisenhardt 1989), risk-sharing problem is one that arises when 
cooperating agents have different attitudes towards risk; agency theory broadened this risk-
sharing literature to include the so-called agency problem that occurs when cooperating 
agents have different goals and vision.  
It is important to answer the question of whether multi-agency can be an advantage or not, 
the question arises from the discussion in previous paragraph. The answer assists in better 
understanding supply network management and effectiveness. Figure 1 next page illustrates 
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the relation between agency theory, risk, and collaboration in a multi-agent supply network. 
(Janssen 2005) found that the multi-agent system increases the level of flexibility in the 
supply network and enables supply network agents to become more responsive. This has a 
positive impact on the network performance, but it can only be achieved through managing 
the relations between agents. A big part of managing relations between agents is managing 
risk and collaboration in the supply network.  
This paper suggests that the answer to the agency problem lies in controlling risk and 
encouraging collaboration in the supply network. A critical element in achieving supply 
network effectiveness is establishing and nurturing trust across the supply network 
boundaries, particularly for relationships such as alliances between agents (Johnston, 
McCutcheon et al. 2004). Risk in the supply network drives agent’s behaviors and attitudes. 
The more risk an agent can sense in the surrounding network, the more risk-averse they will 
become. This will change their behavior towards other agents and the whole network. The 
agent’s flexibility is expected to reduce as a result.  
 
 
Figure	  1:	  Overview	  of	  current	  research:	  managing	  risk	  and	  collaboration,	  and	  
expected	  effect	  on	  Supply	  network.	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Risk and uncertainty can be minimized through improving visibility as demonstrated in 
Figure 1. If one or more agents of a supply network have no detailed knowledge of what 
goes on in other parts of the network, they will face uncertainty. Hence, improving visibility 
and sharing information can eliminate uncertainty. Sharing information can also be means to 
improved collaboration between agents. According to (Skjoett-Larsen, Christian et al. 2003) 
the concept of supply chain management was introduced in the 1980’s in accordance with the 
great focus on information-sharing collaboration. Collaboration changed agents relationships 
in supply networks from “arms-length” relations, which are characterized by distrust and 
competition to “strategic partnerships”. In addition to visibility, supply chain confidence 
requires the ability to take control of supply chain operations (Christopher and Lee 2004). 
Paradoxically, control is not always good. Too much control, or concentrated distribution of 
control between agents makes for lack of trust, it can also cripple the development of the 
network. 
Another key component for finding leverage in multi-agency in a supply network and 
acquiring competitive advantage is performance monitoring. Supply network metrics are 
crucial to supply network management and they are used to determine whether or not the 
objectives of the supply network are being achieved and the addressed (Otto and Kotzab 
2003; Robertson 2006). Measuring performance is a way of monitoring expected 
improvement from adjusting supply network relationships and collaboration.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, the	   relationship	   between	   agents	   in	   the	   supply	   network	   is	  
surrounded	  by	  risk,	  with	  some	  level	  of	  collaboration	  between	  the	  agents.	  The plan is to 
improve supply network relationships by applying some adjustments. Reducing risk and 
improving collaboration achieve this intended adjustment. Reducing risk is done through 
improving visibility, information sharing, and trying to redistribute control more evenly. 
Control can be distributed evenly by giving all agents some control over the supply network 
processes to some extent. Collaboration in turn is improved by sharing information freely 
between agents. The information sharing strategy is expected to deliver on much more than 
just improved collaboration, information sharing also improves visibility as discussed earlier, 
visibility in turn replaces risk with trust and eliminates uncertainty. Once the supply network 
relation adjustments are achieved, the expected performance improvement is to be monitored 
by utilizing supply network metrics. Both flexibility and agency cost are used to monitor 
performance improvements. Flexibility is expected to increase by reducing risk and adopting 
an information sharing strategy in the network. Agency cost is expected to significantly 
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reduce by improving collaboration and trust. A comparison between flexibility and agency 
cost prior to- and after change in network relationships closes the feedback loop back to the 
supply network as demonstrated on Figure 1. A positive change in either or both metrics is 
an indicative of a successful attempt for improvement.  
	  
5. RESEARCH  
The identified research problem is “the divergence between ideal and actual supply network 
relationship set up”. For the purpose, the following research question was set to direct the 
research: 
“To what extent, and how does multi-agency affect relationships, risk, and collaboration in a 
supply network and what is its impact on overall performance?”  
The following hypotheses were developed for the purpose of this hypotheses-testing	  
research:	  
H1: Agency problem in a given supply network will increase agency costs incurred by 
agents and reduce flexibility. 
H2: Agency cost and flexibility provides an accurate indication of how negatively 
agency problem is affecting performance in a given network. 
H3: Performance can be improved by changing supply networks collaboration, and 
trust after understanding agency problems impact.  
The	  research	  is	  currently	  still	  in	  its	  early	  stages.	  After	  developing	  the	  research	  question	  
and	   hypotheses	   a	   thorough	   review	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature	   was	   carried	   out,	   the	  
literature	   review	   is	   being	   finalized.	   The	   next	   step	   would	   be	   to	   start	   designing	   an	  
electronic	  survey	  for	  data	  collection.	  Once	  the	  data	  is	  collected,	  the	  next	  step	  would	  be	  
to	  analyze	  the	  data	  and	  interpret	  it.	  The	  outcome	  is	  expected	  to	  either	  support	  or	  defy	  
the	  hypotheses	  developed.	  
	  
A	  future	  suggested	  direction	  from	  this	  discussion	  would	  be:	  	  
Q1.	  Is	  multiplicity	  of	  agents	  in	  a	  supply	  network	  good	  or	  bad?	  	  





Abud	  Natour,	  Peter	  Gibson	  	   10	  
6. REFERENCES 
Bagchi,	  P.	  K.,	  B.	  C.	  Ha,	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  "Supply	  chian	  integration:	  a	  European	  survey."	  The	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Logistics	  Management	  16(2):	  275-­‐294.	  
Christopher,	   M.	   and	   H.	   Lee	   (2004).	   "Mitigating	   Supply	   Chain	   Risk	   through	   Improved	  
Confidence."	   International	   Journal	   of	   Physical	   Distribution	   and	   Logistics	  
Management	  34(5):	  388-­‐396.	  
Cohen,	   A.	   and	   Y.	   Baruch	   (2010).	   "An	   agency	   theory	   perspective	   of	   the	   israeli	   labor	  
market	  segmentatoin:	  past,	  present,	  and	   future."	  Human	  resource	  management	  
review	  20(2010):	  186-­‐193.	  
Davidsson,	   P.,	   L.	   Henesey,	   et	   al.	   (2005).	   "An	   analysis	   of	   agent-­‐based	   approaches	   to	  
transport	  logistics."	  Transportation	  Research:	  255-­‐271.	  
Eisenhardt,	   K.	   M.	   (1989).	   "Agency	   theory:	   assessment	   and	   review."	   Academy	   of	  
management	  journal	  14(1).	  
Ellram,	   L.	   M.	   and	   M.	   C.	   Cooper	   (1993).	   "The	   relationship	   between	   supply	   chain	  
management	  and	  Keiretsu."	  The	   International	   Journal	  of	  Logistics	  Management	  
4(1):	  1-­‐12.	  
Garcia-­‐Flores,	  R.,	  X.	  Z.	  Wang,	  et	  al.	  (2000).	  "Agenct-­‐based	  informaiton	  flow	  for	  process	  
industries'	   suply	   chain	  modelling	   	   "	   Computers	   and	   Chemical	   Engineering	  24:	  
1135-­‐1141.	  
Griffith,	  D.	  A.,	  M.	  G.	  Harvey,	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  "Social	  exchange	  in	  supply	  chain	  relationships:	  
The	   resulting	   benefits	   of	   procedural	   and	   distribuive	   justice."	   Journal	   of	  
operations	  management.	  24:	  85-­‐98.	  
Janssen,	  M.	   (2005).	   "The	   architecture	   and	   business	   vale	   of	   a	   semi-­‐cooperative,	   agent-­‐
based	   supply	   chian	   management	   system."	   Electronic	   commerce	   research	   and	  
applications	  4:	  315-­‐328.	  
Jensen,	   M.	   C.	   and	  W.	   H.	   Meckling	   (1976).	   "Theory	   of	   the	   Firm:	   Managerial	   Behavior,	  
Agency	  Costs	  and	  Ownership	  Structure."	  Journal	  of	  Financial	  Economics	  3:	  305-­‐
360.	  
Johnston,	   D.	   A.,	   D.	   M.	   McCutcheon,	   et	   al.	   (2004).	   "Effects	   of	   supplier	   trust	   on	  
performance	   of	   cooperative	   supplier	   relationships."	   Journal	   of	   Operations	  
Management.	  22:	  23-­‐38.	  
Lummus,	  R.	  R.,	  R.	  J.	  Vokurta,	  et	  al.	  (1998).	  "Strategic	  supply	  chan	  planning."	  Production	  
and	  planning	  Journal	  39(3):	  49-­‐58.	  
Nooteboom,	  N.	   and	  F.	   Six	   (2003).	   Introduction	   in	  The	  Trust	  Process	   in	  Organisations.	  
Gloucestershire,	  UK,	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  Ltd.	  
Otto,	   A.	   and	   H.	   Kotzab	   (2003).	   "Does	   supply	   chain	   management	   really	   pay?	   Six	  
perspectives	  to	  measure	  the	  performance	  of	  managing	  a	  supply	  chain."	  European	  
Journal	  of	  Operational	  Research	  144:	  306-­‐320.	  
Robertson,	   P.	  W.	   (2006).	   The	   impact	   of	   supply	   chain	   process	   integration	   on	   business	  
performance.	  School	  of	  business	  management	  Sydney.	  Wollongong,	  University	  of	  
Wollongong.	  PhD:	  1-­‐303.	  
Ross,	   S.	   A.	   (1977).	   "Decision	   making	   under	   uncertainty	   "	   American	   Economic	  
Association	  63(2):	  134-­‐140.	  
Skjoett-­‐Larsen,	   T.,	   T.	   Christian,	   et	   al.	   (2003).	   "Supplt	   chain	   collaboration:	   theoritical	  
perspective	   and	   empirical	   evidence	   "	   International	   Journal	   of	   Physical	  
Distribution	  and	  Logistics	  Management	  33(6).	  
Swaminathan,	   J.	   M.,	   S.	   F.	   Smith,	   et	   al.	   (1998).	   "Modelling	   supply	   chain	   dynamics:	   A	  
multiagent	  approach."	  Decision	  sciences	  29(3).	  
Nov	  2010	  
	  
Abud	  Natour,	  Peter	  Gibson	  	   11	  
Vereecke,	   A.	   and	   S.	   Muylle	   (2006).	   "Performance	   improvement	   through	   supply	   chian	  
collaboration	   in	   Europe."	   International	   journal	   of	   operations	   &	   production	  
management.	  26(11):	  1176-­‐1198.	  
Zsidisin,	   G.	   A.,	   L.	  M.	   Ellram,	   et	   al.	   (2004).	   "An	   analysis	   of	   supply	   risk	   assessment	   and	  
techniques."	   International	   Journal	   of	   Physical	   Distribution	   and	   Logistics	  
Management	  34(5):	  397-­‐413.	  
	  
	  
